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                                                              Abstract 
  The mathematical programming technique Data Envelopment Analysis is used to 
test the hypothesis of Averch and Johnson that utility regulation leads to overuse of 
capital. The regulated firm earns a return s greater than its cost of capital r, an implicit 
capital subsidy resulting in allocative inefficiency. Technical and Allocative inefficiency 
are based on Cost and Production Frontiers from 337 electric generating plants, and r is 
based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Capital is overused relative to fuel, but not 
labor. But regression analysis fails to find a significant relationship between the overuse 
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Introduction 
  The proposition that regulated utilities would inefficiently over-invest in capital 
was first advanced in a seminal paper by Averch and Johnson (1962). They argued that 
utility regulation permits the monopoly supplier to earn a rate of return s that exceeds its 
opportunity cost of capital r, where s is less than the monopoly profit-maximizing return.  
The s-r differential acts as a subsidy to capital which induces a (constrained) profit 
maximizer to increase the amount of capital per unit of output beyond what the true 
factor prices would indicate. In the language of modern frontier analysis, the regulated 
utility is technically efficient (operating on its relevant isoquant) but allocatively 
inefficient (at the wrong point on the isoquant).
1 A considerable literature, both 
theoretical and empirical, was spawned by A-J. But as recently as 2005, Joskow’s survey 
of Regulation for the Handbook of Law and Economics states that empirical tests of the 
A-J hypothesis have not been particularly successful. And Joskow emphasizes that the A-
J model does not address at all the type of X-inefficiency which concerns policymakers.    
  The received literature aimed at testing the A-J hypothesis has focused on 
estimation of a parametric production, cost, profit or input demand function. Even if the 
data and econometric techniques employed are all that one would wish, and they are not, 
this sort of methodology does not separate A-J inefficiency from other sources of 
allocative inefficiency; nor can it account for technical inefficiency, which is simply 
assumed away. Zimmer (1978) and Joskow and Rose (1989) provide useful summaries 
and critiques of the main empirical literature. Most of the previous studies claim to find   3
evidence in support of the A-J hypothesis, but their failure to abstract from technical 
inefficiency means any observed overuse of capital may just as easily be caused by lack 
of cost minimizing behavior by the regulated monopoly as from a distorting capital 
subsidy. Moreover, a credible test of the A-J hypothesis also requires establishing a link 
between any finding of inefficient overuse of capital and the s-r subsidy.  
  Employing Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we find that mean radial technical 
efficiency of 337 electric generating plants is .845, which illustrates that previous studies 
which assume full technical efficiency start out by making a fundamental error. After 
adjusting for technical efficiency by alternately including input slacks as technical or 
allocative inefficiency, we do find evidence of the overuse of capital hypothesized by 
Averch-Johnson. However, we are unable to link the observed inefficiency to the 
difference in the allowed return s and the cost of capital r, leading us to conclude that the 
evidence does not appear to support the hypothesis.     
  This paper takes as its starting point the celebrated 1970 data set used by 
Christensen-Greene (C-G) (1976) to estimate returns to scale of 114 firms in the electric 
generating industry, which itself is an extension of an earlier data set assembled by Marc 
Nerlove. This data is contemporaneous with the era during which the A-J hypothesis was 
first advanced, and is not contaminated by the subsequent oil shocks and related 
distortions. 
   The unit of observation is a cross-section of fossil fueled steam-electric 
generating plants, rather than the utility firms and holding companies studied by 
Christensen-Greene (1976).
2 Using plants avoids the tricky issue of capital aggregation 
pointed out by Cowing and Smith (1978), and the allocation of joint costs of management   4
or maintenance when the utility firm is engaged in other activities, such as supplying 
water or natural gas.  
  Measurement issues and the separable inputs used in the transmission and 
distribution side of the electric utility industry have caused the existing A-J literature to 
focus exclusively on the generation of electric power, and we continue that tradition in 
this paper.
3 Since the Averch-Johnson hypothesis is a description of long-run behavior of 
the regulated utility, all inputs used to generate electricity are assumed to be variable, and 
each is assigned an actual or imputed market price.                                              
Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
       The literature about testing the Averch-Johnson Hypothesis is dominated by 
econometric methods that derive testable hypotheses based on first order optimization 
conditions of cost minimization, profit maximization, etc. Averch-Johnson themselves do 
not address the possibility that the firm might not be operating on its production frontier. 
With the exception of the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) regression model, the 
econometric approach virtually mandates assuming technical efficiency. Typical is 
Courville (1974, 56), who says ￿￿the regulated monopoly will operate on its production 
frontier; thus the regulated firm will not waste the resources it has acquired.￿ Apart from 
imposing, rather than testing for technical efficiency, the econometric approach requires 
assuming and testing a parametric functional form of the underlying technology. In 
addition, all the issues of simultaneity, collinearity, and heteroscedasticty or serial 
correlation of the residuals must also be addressed. Zimmer (op. cit.) catalogues these 
deficiencies in some detail, and also focuses upon the critical shortcomings in the way 
prior studies have measured the cost of capital.     5
  The nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method for determining a 
production frontier to measure efficiency, based on mathematical programming, was first 
introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) 
extended DEA to allow for variable returns to scale. In the ensuing years many 
methodological and conceptual improvements have appeared. As of 2002, more than 
three thousand DEA-related publications are recorded [Ray (2004), 1]. Originally 
intended to deal with situations where price data was lacking and focusing on purely 
technical efficiency between inputs and outputs, it is nowadays possible to use DEA to 
estimate neoclassical cost, profit and revenue frontiers using input and output prices. The 
origin of DEA is reflected in the convention of referring to the units of observation as 
Decision Making Units (DMUs), rather than firms, in order to allow for government or 
non-profit organizations. Chief among the strengths of DEA is that it does not require 
specification of a parametric function to represent the underlying technology. A Cobb-
Douglas, translog, Leontieff and other functional forms are at best a simplified 
approximation to a complicated process, and they have the potential to yield erroneous 
results if the approximation is poor. However, the critical limitation of DEA is that it is 
deterministic, i.e. no account is explicitly taken of measurement error. The absence of an 
error term probably accounts for the slowness with which its use has spread among 
economists, who are mostly brought up in the econometric tradition. The programming 
approach envelops the observed data points and hangs on outlier observations to define 
the efficient frontier.  If these outliers are data errors, the resulting frontier is 
correspondingly compromised. Against this, DEA uses as its point of reference observed 
best practice of peer DMUs, which many observers feel is more appropriate than the   6
parametric approach whose reference is the theoretical maximum output, revenue or 
profit or, minimum cost.  
The DEA Model 
  
      In order to minimize the cost of output we employ the following input oriented DEA 
model [Zhu (2003), 282]:    
                                                        Model 1 
         .                                                     
  Each of n DMUs employs inputs xi to produce yr outputs. The unit price of each 
input is denoted pi and  ~ x io represents the amount of the ith input that minimizes the long 
run total cost.  Lambda is the optimal set of weights used to determine the least cost input 
mix. The observed DMU is denoted with the subscript o. In the present case, n = 337 
generating plants, inputs m = 4: fuel, labor, equipment capital and structure capital. 
Outputs s = 1: annual net generation of kilowatt hours of electricity. The four 
corresponding input prices pi are fuel in cents per thousand BTUs
4, annual wages and 
benefits per plant employee, and the levelized annuity factors for equipment and structure 
capital. Details of the derivation of the inputs and prices are given in the following 
section of the paper. The above cost minimizing DEA model assumes variable returns to 
scale (VRS), and there are no input slacks because the firm is able to fully adjust input 
quantities in the long-run.























































  The maintained hypothesis of Averch-Johnson is that the regulated utility 
employs more than the least-cost quantity of capital, but that it operates in a technically 
efficient manner. In order to decompose cost inefficiency into its technical and allocative 
components we must also determine the efficient production function frontier for the 337 
utility plant DMUs. To that end, the following VRS envelopment model is employed: 
                                                         Model 2 
θ
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  Model 2 is input-oriented, where the inputs are minimized and the output kept at 
its observed level. DMUo represents one of the n DMUs under evaluation, and xio and  yro 
are the ith input and rth output. θ* is the input-oriented efficiency score of DMUo. Since 
θ = 1 is a feasible solution, the optimal value θ* ≤ 1. If θ* = 1, the current input levels 
cannot be proportionally reduced while holding output constant, and DMUo  is on the 
production function frontier. If θ* < 1, then DMUo is dominated by the frontier. Since the 
solution to this model involves only equi-proportionate reduction in all inputs, positive 
input and output slacks may be present (Zhu, 7). The following linear programming 
model is used to determine any non-zero slacks after the DEA envelopment model 2 is 
solved (ibid). 
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Data 
  The data set starts with a cross-section of 114 Class A and B privately owned 
electric generating utility firms.
6  The final data set consists of 337 plants, representing 95 
of the 114 original firms. In the DEA methodology, total cost is the product of input 
quantities and the unit prices of each input, rather than the observed expenditures on 
inputs of the DMU. The latter is typically available only at the level of the firm rather 
than the plant.
7 Fuel prices vary by plant, but labor and capital costs are the same across 
the plants of each firm. The number of plants per firm varies from one to nine. Summary 
statistics are presented in Table 1. Firms in the original C-G data set are omitted primarily 
for lack of capital market information. Some firms’ securities are not rated by Moody’s or, 
they placed their bonds or stocks privately. In some instances no stock market betas are 
available, and in a few other cases some basic information such as the original cost of the 
generating plant is not reported by the Federal Power Commission (1971). 
  Capital stock is built up from the original construction cost of steam-electric  
generating equipment and structure, treated separately. The Handy-Whitman Index of 
power plant construction costs for six geographic regions is used to index the original 
plant and structure costs to 1970 dollar amounts [Whitman, Requardt and Associates. 
(1970)]. Conventional (indoor), outdoor and semi-outdoor plants are separately indexed. 
This is our basic measure of the capital stock. Annual fuel input is measured in BTUs at   9
the plant level, and labor input is the number of workers reported as working at each 
generating plant. Plant output is the net generation of kilowatt hours of electricity in 
1970. The firm’s cost of capital is the weighted average rate of return on equity capital, 
preferred stock, long-term debt and notes.
8  The Capital Asset Pricing Model is used to 
estimate the cost of equity capital [Kolbe, Read and Hall (1984) and Coelli, Estache,   
Perelman and Trujillo (2003)]. Stock market betas are from the Value-Line company 
(1971); and the risk free interest rate and the mean stock market risk premium are from 
Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1989).
9  The interest cost of long-term (30 year) debt capital is 
estimated for each firm by fitting a regression equation to data on bonds issued by sixty-
seven Class A and B utilities in 1969. The bond rate is regressed against Moody’s bond 
rating, the month of issue and the maturity date. This regression is then used to predict 
the interest rate for a 30 year bond issued in June for every firm in the data set. A similar 
approach was used to estimate the rate of return on newly issued preferred stock. A Notes 
rate of interest of .0665, also from Ibbotson and Sinquefield, is assumed to be the same 
for all firms, due to a lack of firm-level data about this item. The relative amount of each 
type of capital, needed to construct the weighted average, is from the FPC (1970-71). 
During the 1960s the federal corporate income tax rate was over fifty percent, so the 
weighted average cost of capital incorporates the tax deductibility of debt interest, which 
reduces the mean cost of capital from about .08 to .06. Thus the A-J cost of capital r is 
firm-specific, and incorporates the most important investment risks.  Christensen-Greene 
(op. cit.) used the dollar amount of debt interest and the book value of depreciation as 
their cost of capital. They acknowledge its limitations and actually suggest the approach 
taken here [Greene (1976), 128]. Moreover, since C-G were estimating a cost function it   10
was not necessary for them to estimate the stock of capital. Atkinson and Halvorsen (op. 
cit., 87) used the national average interest rate of AAA utility bonds as their r.  
  The ideal measure of the ’price’ of capital is the imputed rental price or user cost 
of capital, which incorporates the foregone rate of return r and  the depreciation or ’using 
up’ of capital, plus any capital gains or losses on the capital asset. In order to estimate 
economic depreciation, the useful life of the asset is needed. It is common in capital stock 
estimation to assume a uniform life and time profile of depreciation, e.g., straight-line, 
declining balance, etc. [Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980) and Ulmer (1960)]. That is not 
entirely satisfactory in the present situation because the economic life of an asset is 
clearly a choice variable of interest when assessing the A-J hypothesis, not a 
technological constant. The method used here treats the levelized annuity factor that 
would permit recovery of the replacement cost as an annual mortgage payment as the 
’price of capital’, with the annuity interest rate set equal to the weighted cost of capital r 
and the annuity life equal to the predicted economic life of the generating plant 
equipment. The same method is used for structure capital, except that we are forced to 
assume a uniform life of 45 years because of the absence of relevant information about 
structure retirements. The life of structure capital is from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (1999).  The virtue of this annuity factor method is that the user cost is the same 
over the life of the asset, and it is not very sensitive to variations in the predicted life 
span.  
  In order to estimate the economic life of generating plants, data on the fifty-five 
retirements of steam electric plants that occurred during the 1960’s is used to fit a 
parametric (Weibull) regression survivor function (available from the authors). The fitted   11
life of the generating equipment is a function of (real) fuel prices, interest rates, wage 
costs and the effective federal corporate tax rate [Kiefer (1980)]. This equation is then 
used to predict the economic life, as of 1970, of each plant then in service.
10 Owing to the 
nature of the data, we are forced to assume all the plants owned by a particular firm have 
the same economic life. To illustrate our method, suppose the weighted average cost of 
capital is .10 and equipment service life is 20 years, then the level annuity factor is .117, 
this is the ’price’ of capital employed in DEA Model 1. A utility whose generating plant’s 
replacement cost is $100 million thus incurs annualized user costs of $11.74 million in 
interest and depreciation.  
                                                                Table 1 
                                                     Descriptive Statistics 
                                                             (N = 337) 
                  Variable                               Mean                         Standard Deviation 
        Net Generation                       2409 Million KWH                   2155 
        Fuel Price                               0.321 cents/KWH                      0.089  
        Wage Rate                              $7983/year                                $1307 
        Price of Capital                      0.090                                          0.007 
        Price of Structures                  0.064                                          0.003 
        Fuel Input                               25,076,415 (000’s BTUs)         20,332,857 
        Employees                                 114                                             80 
        Generating Equipment           $110,694,000                        $109,719,000  




   The basic VRS cost minimizing Model 1 yields a mean cost efficiency score of 
.78.  Therefore, these 337 steam-electric plants could lower production costs by an 
average of twenty-two percent if they eliminated existing overuse of all inputs and non-
cost minimizing input proportions.  
  Turning to the separation of technical from allocative efficiency, the VRS 
production frontier of Model 2 shows a mean radial technical efficiency score of .843.   12
Thus all inputs could be proportionally reduced by about fifteen percent, while holding 
electricity output constant at the observed level.
 11 Model 3 then optimizes the slacks 
remaining after the maximum proportional reduction of all inputs (also holding output 
constant), and results in target technically efficient amounts of each input quantity which 
are less than or equal to the radially reduced amounts. Disagreement exists as to whether 
input slacks should be regarded as a form of technical or allocative inefficiency. The A-J 
model is based on the smoothly convex isoquants of neoclassical microeconomics, in 
which there are no slacks-- which are due to the piecewise linear nature of DEA 
isoquants. In what follows next we allocate the input slacks to technical inefficiency, on 
the grounds that this is most consistent with the original A-J framework. This constitutes 
the most stringent test of the A-J hypothesis because the smallest amount of measured 
economic inefficiency is attributed to incorrect input proportions. We also consider the 
alternate specification which treats the slacks as a form of allocative inefficiency.   
  Since the maintained A-J hypothesis involves input proportions, it is necessary to 
focus on the technically efficient input ratios relative to the least-cost ratios. Let (K/F) 
represent the technically efficient ratio of generating capital (K) to fuel input (F), based 
on the slack optimized target inputs (slacks treated as technical inefficiency). Denote the 
cost minimizing ratio of generating capital to fuel as (K*/F*). If the (K/F) / (K*/F*) ratio 
equals unity, there is no allocative inefficiency in the sense proposed by A-J: the 
technically efficient input ratio is also allocatively efficient. If this ratio exceeds unity, 
then capital is overused because the firm is not operating where the piecewise linear 
corner of the isoquant is tangent to the isocost line defined by unsubsidized input prices. 
A similar approach applies to structure capital (S) and labor (L).   13
                                                                  Figure 1 
                                               
  The isoquant-isocost diagram of Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework 
herein employed, using the example of generating capital K and fuel input F. Averch-
Johnson maintains that the capital subsidy s-r distorts the input price ratio from that 
represented by isocost line EE’ to RR’, resulting in overuse of capital at point C, instead 
of the technically and allocatively efficient point A. The ratio of factor proportions (K/F) 
/ (K*/F*) thus measures the extent of the A-J induced allocative inefficiency.    
  Suppose that the firm is observed producing output Qo using the amounts of K 
and F indicated by point D. Its radial technical efficiency is the ratio OC/OD < 1, and its 
radial allocative efficiency is OB/OC < 1. Point B lies on the same least cost isocost line 
EE’. This firm’s overall cost efficiency CE = OB/OD.
12 The DEA production frontier 
projects point D back onto the isoquant at C, and the cost minimization program 
identifies point B.       14
  Table 2 summarizes five sets of inefficiency ratios based on the preceding 
discussion. The salient point of Table 2 is that both generating capital and structure 
capital are overused relative to fuel input, but not relative to labor. (The original A-J 
paper considered only capital and labor. In fact, labor accounts for only 12.5 percent of 
the average generating cost per kilowatt hour of the Class A and B electric utility industry 
in 1970 [Greene (1976), 15]). Slacks are treated as technical inefficiency in Table 2.   
                                                              Table 2  
                                            Allocative Inefficiency Ratios    
                                                               (N = 337) 
 
                Factor Proportion            Mean Ratio        Standard Error               Range 
                (K/L)/ (K*/L*)                      1.01                   0.009                      .04 - 1.96 
 
                (S/L)/(S*/L*)                        0.92                  0.010                       .12 - 3.15    
 
                (K/F)/(K*/F*)                      1.20                   0.013                      .13 - 3.00 
 
                (S/F)/(S*/F*)                        1.11                   0.017                      .20 - 4.93 
 
                (L/F)/(L*/F*)                        1.20                  0.010                       .61 ￿ 3.46  
                Note: K = generating equipment, S = structure capital, L = labor, F =fuel. 
                Starred variables are cost minimizing. 
  
The DEA evidence in Table 2 does appear to support the A-J hypothesis, although not in 
precisely the manner they suggested. Overuse of capital is most pronounced in the case of 
generating equipment (K) relative to fuel (F), in which case ninety percent of plants 
employ more than the cost minimizing ratio of these two inputs. If only the A-J effect 
was operative we would expect no distortion in the use of fuel and labor, but Table 2 
shows that these inputs are also not used in a cost minimizing manner. 
13 
  Turning next to the case where slacks are treated as a type of allocative 
inefficiency, we use the following relationship: AE =  CE/TE, where AE is the 
proportionate or radial measure of allocative efficiency, CE is radial cost efficiency and   15
TE is the proportionate measure of technical efficiency [See Coelli, et. al. (2005), 184]. 
In the present instance AE = .78/.843 = .925.  From this perspective, the electric utility 
industry is quite efficient in adjusting input proportions to relative factor prices. In 
addition to these radial measures of efficiency, we compute the analog to the allocative 
efficiency ratios of Table 2, except that now the input slacks are assumed to be a form of 
allocative inefficiency. The mean inefficiency ratios of generating capital and structure 
capital to fuel inputs are 2.89 and 4.66, respectively. Contrast these numbers with the 
1.20 and 1.11 ratios of Table 2 where slacks are treated as part of technical inefficiency.   
  Implicit in the A-J hypothesis is the assumption that the only reason a utility firm 
is allocatively inefficient in its use of capital is the regulatory-based capital subsidy s-r. 
Today we understand that a variety of forces could be at work, and the following section 
of the paper seeks to more directly link the observed inefficiency to the  Averch-Johnson 
hypothesis.
14  
Second-Stage Regression Analysis   
  In this section of the paper we regress the various input ratios and efficiency 
scores against regulatory and environmental variables in order to determine if the 
apparent overuse of capital is significantly linked to the A-J subsidy effect.
15  
  The Federal Power Commission calculates a uniform definition of the rate of 
return earned by electric utility companies: (Operating Revenue ￿ Operating Expenses ￿ 
Depreciation ￿ Taxes)/ (Rate Base). The Rate Base is the depreciated value of the net 
electric plant plus working capital [FPC (1971), 751]. Although this measure of return on 
capital is based on accounting data and historic cost depreciation, it has the considerable 
advantage of uniformity across firms and state regulatory jurisdictions. Rates of return   16
computed at the state-level suffer from varying definitions of what constitutes the rate 
base [See Phillips (1969), 216- 302]. The FPC rate of return is likely positively correlated 
with the s posited by A-J. For the cost of capital r we use the previously explained 
weighted average cost of capital for each firm. This new variable s-r, whose mean value 
is 1.6 percentage points, represents the estimated capital subsidy of Averch and Johnson. 
  Although fourteen Tobit regressions are estimated, we only report four of them in 
Table 3 in order to conserve space (the others are available from the authors). The basic 
conclusion is the same in each instance: there is no statistically significant relationship 
between the overuse of capital, regardless of how measured, and the s-r capital subsidy. 
All of the estimated regressions use the same two sets of explanatory variables as shown 
in Table 3. The dependent variables are the inefficiency ratios relating to generating 
capital and fuel because that is the most important type of capital. Equations (1) and (3) 
treat slacks as technical inefficiency, whereas equations (2) and (4) count them as 
allocative inefficiency. The first two equations in Table 3 employ as regressors only the 
capital subsidy s-r plus two indicator variables to represent the 1960s state-level 
regulatory environment which use rate base definitions that vary from that used by the 
FPC.  About twenty states defined the rate base according to the Supreme Court’s ’fair 
value’ standard (Phillips, op. cit., 220). A number of other states, including New York 
and California, adhered to the original cost doctrine in defining the base upon which the 
utility is permitted to earn a return. The remaining states used various other definitions, 
such as reproduction cost or ’prudent investment’ to define the rate base (Phillips, op. cit., 
272-274). These ’other’ states are the default category for the two indicator variables. 
Coefficients and other statistics that are statistically significant (95% or better) are shown   17
in bold type. T-ratios are shown in parentheses.  In neither equation (1) or (2) is a higher 
return on capital positively linked to overuse of capital, which is the basic A-J hypothesis.  
  Equations (3) and (4) in Table 3 expand the set of explanatory variables to include 
factors that might obscure the regulatory impact on the firm’s capital stock.
 16  These 
added variables include whether or not the firm is part of a holding company, or a 
member of a power pool (indicator variables), the percent of net revenue devoted to 
research and development, the number of boiler/turbine units in the plant, five regional 
indicator variables designed to capture possible weather-related effects, with the North 
Atlantic region as the default,
17 an indicator whether it uses the older indoor boilers 
format (versus the more modern outdoor or semi-outdoor setup), the age of the plant in 
years, fuel type indicators (versus the dominant coal-fired plant), variability of demand 
(load factor), and capacity utilization (plant factor). As in the case of the simpler 
specification, there is scant evidence to support the Averch-Johnson hypothesis. The s-r 
coefficient in specification (3) is positive, but the t-ratio is only 1.25.  In specification (4) 
the same variable has a negative and insignificant coefficient.   
  In a regression using structure capital and fuel input ratios (not presented), the 
coefficient on the capital subsidy variable is significant but negative. This case treats 
slacks as part of technical inefficiency. In addition, we also regressed the three radial 
efficiency scores (cost, allocative and technical) against the same explanatory variables 
used in Table 3. There is some evidence (90 % level of significance) that the larger the 
capital subsidy s-r, the higher are the efficiency scores. This is what might be expected, 
but is evidence against the A-J hypothesis which argues that the larger the subsidy the 
less efficient is the firm.                        18
                                                                   Table 3 
                           Second-Stage Regression Analysis of Economic Efficiency 
                                                                      Dependent Variables 
   (K/F)/(K*/F*)  (k/f)/(k*/f*) (K/F)/(K*/F*)  (k/f)/(k*/f*) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
      (1)      (2)          (3)       (4) 
Constant      1.24 
   (31.31) 
  3.15 
  (9.65) 
       1.06 
     (14.38) 
   0.353 
   (0.80) 
s-r Capital Subsidy     0.0007 
    (0.53)    
 -0.09 
 (-0.80)  
      0.018 
      (1.25) 
  -0.049 
   (-0.58) 
Fair Value State    -0.024 
   (-0.60)  
  0.325 
  (0.98) 
    -0.048 
    (-1.18) 
   0.254 
   (1.04) 
Original Cost State     -0.062 
    (-1.64)  
-0.398 
 (-1.26) 
   -0.033 
    (-0.77) 
  -0.03 
   (-0.14) 
Holding Company         -0.050  (-1.37)    0.035  (0.18) 
Power Pool Member         -0.027  (-0.51)    -0.110  (-0.35) 
R & D Spending         -0.026  (-0.33)   -0.005  (-0.01) 
Boiler-Turbine Units          0.005   (0.52)     0.150 (2.85) 
South Atlantic Region         -0.067  (-1.32)   -0.348  (-1.16) 
South Central Region         -0.057  (-0.70)   -0.336  (-0.69) 
North Central Region         -0.056  (-1.27)    0.409 (1.57) 
Pacific Region         -0.011  (-0.14)    0.424 (0.90) 
Plateau Region          0.054  (0.76)   -0.258  (-0.62) 
Indoor Plant          0.140  (4.08)   -0.273 (-1.35) 
Plant Age          0.003  (2.05)     0.089 (11.4) 
Oil          0.067  (1.12)     1.100 (3.12)  
Gas        -0.083  (-1.33)   -0.434  (-1.17) 
Mixed Fuel         -0.001 (-0.05)      0.233 (1.21) 
Load Variability          0.017 (0.68)    -0.090 (-0.60)
Capacity Utilization         -0.000 (0.00)   -0.005  (-0.55) 
Sigma  0.247 (25.14)  2.02 (25.14)     0.223 (25.14) 1.32   (25.14) 
Log Likelihood        -6.43  -671.7       25.54     -536.2 
Number of Obs.         316      316        316      316 
Note: upper case dependent variables treat slacks as technical inefficiency; lower case 
variables treat the slacks as allocative inefficiency.                                                                                             
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         It is more than forty years since Averch and Johnson advanced their intriguing and 
controversial hypothesis that utility regulation intended to curb the inefficiency arising 
from monopoly could inadvertently result in an offsetting inefficiency in the form of 
excessive use of capital. Five of the six most cited studies of the A-J effect summarized 
by Zimmer (1978) find evidence in support of it, as do Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980). 
Given that we also find significant evidence of overcapitalization, it is understandable 
that these other authors found in favor of the A-J hypothesis. But they erred by assuming 
that the only cause of economic inefficiency could be the A-J effect. Once technical 
inefficiency is netted out, and a direct link to the return on the utility’s rate base relative 
to its cost of capital is tested for, we find little evidence to support the A-J hypothesis.  
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                                                              Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Some authors refer to allocative inefficiency as price inefficiency. 
2 A generating plant consists of one or more furnace-boilers, and linked turbine generator units. 
3 Courville (ibid. 59) argues that distribution and transmission are probably characterized by fixed input 
proportions. He further maintains that transmission systems are initially overbuilt to allow for growth or 
power pooling, making inefficient overinvestment hard to detect, and that electricity distribution has been 
characterized by confounding changes in technology absent on the generating side.  
4 Following Christensen-Greene, all fossil fuel inputs are converted to BTU equivalents and priced per 
BTU. This implicitly assumes the firm has selected the cost-minimizing mix of fuels. 
5 Two separate cost frontiers based on Conventional (Indoor) boiler plants versus Outdoor and Semi 
Outdoor plants were estimated. The Wilcoxon nonparametric test of the hypothesis that the separate 
efficiency scores are drawn from the same parent distribution is not rejected, with a t-ratio of  -1.64. Thus 
we proceed by assuming the underlying technology is the same across the data set.    
6 Class A and B utilities have annual net revenues in excess of $2.5 million. 
7 In principle, one could construct plant level costs by multiplying actual or imputed factor prices by 
observed inputs quantities, and then employ a technique such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis.  
8 The mean proportion of each element of capital is as follows: common stock equity (.35), preferred stock 
(.086), long term (30 year) debt (.514) and notes (.045). The tax deductibility of debt interest is not 
explicitly considered, but this should not make much difference because cross-section (federal) tax rates 
should be the same and the capital structure is fairly similar across firms.   
9 The Value Line stock betas cover a period of at least two years.  
10 The mean service life of retired plants is 29.4 years, and the predicted mean life is 19.4 years. This 
difference may be due to the corporate tax changes introduced in the 1960’s that were favorable to the 
capital-intensive utility industry. 
11 229 plants are found to operate in the region of the production frontier where there is increasing returns 
to scale, 6 in the region of constant returns to scale and only 2 where there is decreasing returns. 
12 Note that OB/OC = (OB/OD) / (OC/OD).  
13 It is worth noting that fuel is systematically underused relative to capital and labor. Since its market price 
in 1970 was likely less than the social cost because of pollution relating to coal fired plants, it is possible 
that any distorting capital subsidy due to the A-J effect causes less social inefficiency than otherwise might 
occur. 
14 Electricity generated by fossil fuels, especially coal which is the dominant fuel source, generates 
significant external social costs in the form of air pollution.  Significant carbon taxes on use of fossil fuels 
have been proposed in order to internalize these external costs. That the regulatory capital subsidy causes 
overuse of capital and under use of fuel might be viewed as a Second Best resource allocation issue. 
15 All the regressions are estimated using the Tobit model, owing to the limited range of the alternate 
dependent variables. 
16 The number of observations is less than the full 337 because of missing data. 
17 The regions are the same as used in the Handy-Whitman Index to adjust the construction cost of capital.  